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Abstract 
 
The redistricting process in the United States of America has been viewed as an 
unfair, manipulative procedure of drawing redistricting lines to benefit the 
politicians in power. In an attempt to stop this by creating a more transparent and 
improved redistricting process, certain states have implemented redistricting 
commissions for both state legislative and congressional redistricting.  This study 
will analyze the six congressional redistricting commissions and attempt to see if 
the structure of the commissions plays an essential role in its ability to succeed.  
Of the six commissions, Arizona was the only state that failed to meet these 
expectations and was accused of gerrymandering, which has inspired this 
comparative analysis of Arizona, the deviant case. 
By using Hague & Harrop’s structural approach, this research essay will 
explore variables such as the commission’s size, how the commission members 
are selected, their time frame for creating a redistricting plan, what party 
affiliation has the majority in that state, if the commission is bi/nonpartisan and if 
it is independent or politician based, in order to evaluate if there are any 
significant patterns or interesting differences between the commissions that are 
successful and Arizona’s redistricting commission. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Every ten years, the United State’s Census Bureau counts the population of each 
state, in order to give an accurate representation of how many people live in each 
state.  These statistics are imperative since the population is constantly changing, 
with people moving from and to different states, and it is essential to evaluate how 
much representation in the House of Representatives each state should get in 
accordance to their population.  This census is a part of the constitution and has 
been carried out every ten years since 1790.  The purpose of this is to evaluate not 
only how many seats in the House of Representatives each state shall receive 
according to its population, but also to verify how much federal funds will be 
dispersed to different communities based on the population (Census 2010).   
 
Once the data that is released from the census is used to reapportion the 
amount of congressional seats that each state obtains, the process of redistricting 
commences.  Redistricting is the procedure of drawing district lines that establish 
electoral voters. Each state is responsible for redistricting in order to give accurate 
representation of its people and these district lines are especially important since 
the result can affect who represents your for a decade, up until the next census.  
What is surprising is that the United States of America is “the only advanced 
democracy in the world where politicians directly participate in the redistricting 
process” (Endgerrymandering 2013).  
 
The redistricting process has received heavy critique over a long period of 
time due to the cases where political manipulation has been blatant since it is the 
power holding politicians who draw the districts.  It is stated that “the power to 
redraw electoral lines is the power to design elections.  Enormous significance 
therefore attaches to any delegation of redistricting authority” (Manheim 2013, P. 
564). The term gerrymandering is used to describe the manipulation of districting 
lines to “maximize the efficiency of a party’s support” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 
183). The term was first exercised in 1812 when Governor Gerry of 
Massachusetts drew a district that was so evidently designed to benefit his party.  
The shape of the district was similar to that of a salamander and with that, the 
term was created and the increased awareness for future electoral district 
manipulation started (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 183). 
 
Although gerrymandering is illegal in the United States of America, there 
have still been occasions where redistricting results have been questionable.  It is 
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an unfair way for elected leaders to “maintain political power while avoiding 
demographic realities” and “the nastiest form of politics that there is”. (Draper 
2012, P. 52).  The term “one person, one vote,” is a phrase coined by the Supreme 
Court at an attempt to fix this problem.  One person, one vote “established the 
principle that equal numbers of people deserve equal representation.” (Hebert & 
Jenkins 2011, p. 545).  However, it is still apparent that “sometimes the 
distribution of seats in a state legislature or congress delegation has little 
correlation to a state’s overall voting pattern”, which is unacceptable in a 
democratic system (Stephanopoulos 2007, P. 331). 
 
The redistricting is done on many different levels, including being carried out 
through congressional redistricting and state legislative redistricting.  In the past, 
the redistricting of states has been done by each state’s legislative authority, but 
now numerous states have been taking steps towards redistricting reform by 
creating different kinds of commissions, bodies, and advisory boards, to guarantee 
that voters get fair representation and are not cheated by those who draw the lines  
(NCSL 2013).  These reforms are essential since it is crucial that “every vote cast 
in every election should be of equal value, regardless of where a voter lives or for 
whom they vote.”  (Fair vote 2000).  While some states have created these 
commissions for both their congressional and state legislative redistricting, others 
only use it for state legislative redistricting.  It is argued that “redistricting that is 
done by a commission enjoys greater public legitimacy than redistricting carried 
out by the state legislature” and that if “legislative and judicial paths to reform 
remain blocked, they represent the only realistic way for the evils of 
gerrymandering to be redressed.” (Stephanopoulos 2007, P. 337-338).  As clearly 
as it is stated that commissions are a better way to go about redistricting, it is still 
important to study the cases where certain commissions fail to succeed.  
 
1.2 Problem and Research Question 
 
 
As stated previously, numerous states have taken the opportunity to create a board 
that is responsible for the redistricting in order to provide their citizens with equal 
opportunities.  It is important to question the consequences of and success rates of 
these commissions after their implementation to ensure that they are getting their 
job done. For example, New York Times states that 2012 was the year of “the 
great gerrymander,” where statistics show that ten states had unsteadying results 
of representation in regards to the number of votes and number of seats attained in 
the House of Representatives.  Some of these states were in fact states that have 
implemented commissions, both for congressional and state legislative 
redistricting.  It is therefore vital to study these commissions that were not 
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successful with their redistricting in 2012 to see what can improve for the next 
redistricting process.  
 
Although there is a lot of information on the redistricting commissions, there 
is little research on what kind of commission is better than the other or 
explanations for why certain commissions do not succeed.  I believe that this is 
because many of the commissions, especially the ones used for congressional 
redistricting, are fairly new.  If we could find the root of the problem that certain 
redistricting commissions face, we could better implement commissions and 
create a more representative and fair redistricting process. The most prominent 
opinion on the cause of why certain redistricting commissions fail is that the 
majority political party of the state gets too powerful and greedy within the 
commission.  Sam Wang argues that the fault lies with the fact that certain parties 
are more prone to gerrymander to benefit themselves, however, I believe it would 
be interesting to explore other possible explanations and solutions to why certain 
commissions are more prone to gerrymander, as well as continuing to analyze this 
variable (Wang 2013).   
 
For this essay, I have chosen to examine the actual structure of the 
commissions.  By researching solely the structures and organization of these 
different commissions, I may be able to detect if there are any patterns of 
structural affects that could be a reason for the gerrymandering in a certain state.  
Therefore, this essay will examine what kinds of commission structures are 
effective, reliable and trustworthy.  
 
To narrow this question down, this study will only focus on the congressional 
redistricting commissions since it is those that Sam Wang has done his analysis 
on.  It is solely these commissions that this study will examine and not the other 
state legislative commissions, two advisory commissions, 5 back-up commissions 
or Iowa, which has its own redistricting unlike any other state. The motivation for 
why this study will only look at the congressional redistricting commissions is 
because the advisory commissions work with the legislature and the back-up 
commissions are only used if the legislature fails to meet the redistricting 
deadline.  I have also chosen to only focus on the most recent consensus, 
redistricting period and election to keep my study current.  With this problem in 
mind, I have formed the research question: 
 
What types of congressional redistricting commissions, that have been 
implemented to avoid political manipulation in six of the United States of 
America, are successful and are there any visible patterns in the structures or 
organization of the types of successful redistricting commissions? 
 
The ambition of this essay is to see if it is the structure of the commission that 
leads to its unsuccessful redistricting or if it could be other factors such as 
personal party interests overtaking the outcome of the redistricting process.  Some 
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commissions are even structured so that they give majority seats in the 
commission to a certain party and it is important to figure out what affect that has. 
 
This cumulative study is building on other’s research, attempting not only to 
continue to inform how to establish a functional commission, but also to inform 
the public about the redistricting process. If it is in fact the structures of the 
commissions that have an effect on the redistricting politics, than it is important to 
study what kinds of structures are worth implementing and lead to a more 
representative system.  
 
This empirical question is principally interesting because it studies the 
puzzling issue of redistricting and representation in the United State’s electoral 
system. Exploring the implementation of bi and non-partisan redistricting 
commissions and furthermore the abolishment of legislative exploitation of 
redistricting is very important in order to examine what the best alternatives are to 
solve this political issue and improve the electoral system.  An interesting 
research question in the field of politics is finding an actual puzzling situation in 
society and trying to figure it out. This puzzling study will attempt to do just that 
since it is so important to study why these state’s commissions are different from 
the rest and failing to get their job done.   
 
Another reason that this essay is very important is because voters tend to not 
be as informed or to not fully understand the redistricting process as much as they 
should.  Most of the time, voters do not even know when the redistricting process 
occurs (Stephanopoulos 2007, P. 336).  The more widespread that this topic 
becomes to the public and the more information the public receives, then the more 
likely they will stand up for what seems wrong in terms of the redistricting in both 
their communities, and on a national level as well.  Since it is the politicians that 
have the information and power in the redistricting process, voters tend to not be 
as active, which is necessary since “redistricting is a context in which legislators’ 
incentives and the public interest are almost diametrically opposed.  Legislators 
want to win reelection handily and to have their party obtain as many seats as 
possible” and it is important for voters to be aware of redistricting to prevent the 
possibility of political manipulation from the different power holders 
(Stephanopoulos 2007, P. 336).  These redistricting initiatives play a large role in 
citizens every day life.  
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2 Theory and Method 
2.1 Theory 
2.1.1 Hague and Harrop’s five theoretical approaches 
Rod Hague and Martin Harrop write in their book Comparative Government and 
Politics that ”the contemporary study of politics is marked by a variety of 
perspectives that developed at distinct stages in the discipline’s history and which 
continues to be influential alongside each other to this day. By studying these 
approaches, we gain a sense of the different ways in which politics should be 
studied.” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 25). It is important to be able to analyze 
scientific studies from different perspectives in order to gain a full understanding 
of what we are researching.  Hague and Harrop provide five different theoretical 
approaches and one that I found applicable to this study on redistricting 
commissions was the structural approach.  
 
Although I have chosen to focus on the structural approach, I will start this 
theory section by motivating my choice of the structural approach by explaining 
the core of the other possible approaches.  The other four approaches that were 
mentioned were the institutional, behavioral, the rational choice and the 
interpretive choices.  The institutional approach is considered a “central purpose 
of political science in general and of comparative politics in particular.  It 
provided the original foundation of the discipline and so created a baseline from 
which other approaches have developed and against which they can be 
compared.” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 25).  Although the institutional approach in 
a sense may have created the structural approach, I did not choose to look further 
into it seeing as its purpose is “asking whose interests benefit from a particular 
institutional set up.” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 28).  However much this may 
sound adoptable to this study, the institutional choice was not chosen because it 
focuses on the positions and interests of institutions and I found that the structure 
would provide a more fascinating result.  The behavioral approach is a “school of 
thought in political science which emphasized the study of individuals rather than 
institutions […] The aim of the movement was to use scientific methods to 
discover generalizations about political attitudes and behaviour.” (Hague & 
Harrop 2010, P. 28).  This approach was also very interesting but not as useful to 
the case since it was focusing on individual’s behaviour rather than the whole 
commission and its abilities.  The third approach that Hague and Harrop present is 
the rational choice approach, which emphasizes “the interests of the actors as the 
explanatory factors.  The assumption is that people can appraise the alternatives 
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available to them in any specific situation and can consistently choose the option 
that ranks highest in their preference order.” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 33). As 
interesting as it would be to examine the interests and choices that the individuals 
in the omission have to make, I believe that this information would be challenging 
to obtain seeing as the actors are meant to hide their interests and work for the 
sake of drawing the best redistricting lines.  And lastly, the fourth approach that is 
brought up is the interpretive approach which discusses to which degree “the 
structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather 
than material forces and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are 
conducted by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (Hague & Harrop 
2010, P. 39). This approach may be too interpretive and not follow the factual 
information that is necessary for this study. All of these different approaches 
would provide fascinating perspectives and ways to conduct this study, but I am 
most interested in seeing what the structural approach to researching this question 
will present 
 
Another theory that I considered was the party strategic theory, but I thought 
that it would be best to focus on one theory in order to make the purpose of the 
essay as clear as possible, even though this theory would probably be helpful for 
the party affiliation variable of this study. 
  
2.1.2 The Structual Approach 
Hague and Harrop state that the political structuralist’s focus ”on the 
relationships between powerful groups in society […] this constellation of 
interests provides the structure underlying the institutional politics of parties and 
government; it is the framework that underpins and actually determines, actual 
politics.” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 31).  This approach highlights how important 
it is to concentrate on the actual build up and structure of an organization or group 
since this is the reason for its power.   Using this perspective, we may find 
explanations for the commissions motives. Structuralism “holds that 
configurations of social relations shape, constrain and empower actors in 
predictable ways.” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 32).  Perhaps if we understand the 
structure of the commissions, then we can predict what is best for them.  Although 
the structuralist approach is built on Marxist foundation, it is important to 
remember that it does not limit itself to class analysis (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 
33). 
 
An excellent example that is provided in their book is that “to be able to 
appreciate why a bridge is stable, we need to understand how its components 
maintain themselves.” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 33).  According to this example, 
if we want to appreciate why a certain commission succeeds, we need to 
understand how its components maintain themselves.  By learning about what the 
best way to build up a redistricting commission, we can in the future apply this 
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study on the implementation and transformation of other redistricting 
commissions and perhaps if more commissions thrive, than more states will 
establish them for their own redistricting process.  
 
This theory has therefore motivated me to look at the structures of these 
commissions in order to see if the structure is a factor in making the commissions 
successful or unsuccessful.  My ambition is to challenge this theory by seeing if 
there are any patterns of structures of the commissions that have been proven 
more successful.  By doing so, I will be able to analyze if the structure is in fact an 
important factor in the abilities of the commission. 
 
Although the structuralist approach states that there is no best or one way of 
structuring an organization, and that a successful structure is different for different 
organizations, my hypothesis is that we will see a pattern of which type of 
structure proves unsuccessful or even which structure is more apparent in the 
successful commissions and try to figure out what this can depend on.  This 
approach is of great importance in order to analyze the abilities that certain 
structures have in the realm of redistricting.  Seeing as the aim of my study is to 
compare the different groups to find if there is a prevalent structure that provides 
successful redistricting, it is important to analyze the formation of the 
commissions. 
 
Hague and Harrop even provide information from a study done by Skocpol, 
who also focuses on the structural approach.  Skopcol writes that “one must be 
able to identify the objectively conditioned and complex intermeshing of the 
various actions of the diversely situated group…to take such an impersonal and 
nonsubjective viewpoint- one that emphasizes patterns of relationships among 
groups and societies- is to work from what may in some generic sense be called a 
structural perspective on sociohistorical reality.” (Skopcol, 1979 in Hague & 
Harrop 2010, P. 29).  The interesting part to highlight in this quote is the fact that 
he mentions how complex organizations are but yet how essential it is to 
understand them by analyzing their build up. 
 
2.2 Method 
The choice of the structural theoretical approach has led me to focus on the 
structures of the redistricting commissions.  The ambition of this essay is 
therefore to explore if there are any patterns in the successful or unsuccessful 
redistricting commission’s composition. This will therefore be a comparative case 
study between the six different congressional redistricting commissions.  Of these 
six congressional redistricting commissions, Arizona was the only one that was 
accused of not representing its voters, so I will therefore attempt to find an 
explanation for this deviating case. 
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It is imperative that my operationalization on the term successful in regards to 
the redistricting commissions is clear in this essay.  What I mean by successful is 
that this commission is not in one of the states that was accused of the most recent 
large gerrymandering in 2012.  More on the topic of the “great gerrymander” will 
come in the material portion of this essay. 
 
A case study is an “intensive study of a single instance with wider 
significance.” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 44). This is a case of political 
manipulation since it regards power holders adjusting political systems to best 
benefit their own political party.  By identifying themes on which kinds of 
commissions participate in the political manipulation process, we can work to 
avoid this in the future. Therefore, the instance that I use as my reference point is 
the commission that has been accused of participating in this manipulation 
process from a study done in 2012 called the “Great Gerrymander of 2012”.  This 
is significant on a large scale, as I stated previously, to improve the redistricting 
commissions. 
 
Hague and Harrop write that comparative studies “permit us to classify 
political structures and processes”, as well as it enables us “to test hypothesis 
about politics.” (Hague & Harrop 2010, P. 46).  The intention of this study is to 
classify what types of redistricting commissions are successful by testing the 
hypothesis that the structures of the commissions are of crucial importance. By 
comparing and contrasting the structures and information given on the different 
commissions, I will discover if there are any clear patterns that show how well 
different commissions function.  This comparative case study will use the most 
similar design since the commissions are all within the United States and designed 
for the same functions.  
 
The choice of this method allows this research to focus on the comparison of 
the different structures of the commissions while other methods may have made it 
so that the focus was more reliant on factors like the data that the commissions 
provide or analyzing the texts from their meetings.  Using a comparative method 
allows the research to stay broad and have many variables, which was crucial for 
this case. 
 
My research technique for the analysis will consist of a description of the six 
different commission’s structures and attempt to point out any interesting qualities 
of the commissions that may be found on their home pages. Then I will continue 
to analyze what similarities and differences are found between them, and if 
anything in particular stands out with the composition of Arizona’s redistricting 
commission or between the five others who were successful. 
 
Another very important criteria within the social sciences is achieving 
intersubjectivity, which entails ensuring that the project that one has done is clear, 
able to be falsified, and testable so that it is proven that it is actually true and valid 
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(Teorell & Svensson 2007, P. 54).  This is relevant to this study seeing as the 
commissions are sometimes criticized for not being transparent enough, however 
this research has material that is accessible, reliable and valid which has makes it 
very intersubjective.  
 
 
2.3 Material 
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, there are thirteen 
states who use a state legislative redistricting commission, two who use an 
advisory commission, five who use a back up commission, Iowa as an exception 
that conducts redistricting like no other state, and then the rest of the 29 states 
who use legislative authority to draw districting plans.  Six of the states that use 
the state legislative commission also use a congressional redistricting commission, 
which is what I will be looking more specifically at  (NCSL 2013). The six states 
relevant to this study, which are the six who have congressional redistricting 
commissions, are Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, New Jersey, and 
Washington. 
 
Sam Wang conducted a research project in 2012 that pointed out which states 
had gerrymandered after the last redistricting period and found that the “net effect 
of intentional gerrymandering was far larger than any one factor” (Wang 2013).   
This research article was published in a reliable source, New York Times.  His 
study used statistical tools and main argument was that “normally we would 
expect more seats in Congress to go to the political party that receives more votes, 
but the last election confounded expectations. Democrats received 1.4 million 
more votes for the House of Representatives, yet Republicans won control of the 
House by a 234 to 201 margin” (Wang 2013).  This result is unacceptable in an 
advanced democracy.  He continues to argue that “through artful drawing of 
district boundaries, it is possible to put large groups of voters on the losing side of 
every election” (Wang 2013).  However, Wang developed a strategy to discover 
this manipulative tactic by only scrutinizing election returns and analyzing each 
state to see that “the party that wins more than half the votes should get at least 
half the seats” (Wang 2013).  He realized that ten states have unsymmetrical seat 
allotment.  These ten states are Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Sam Wang’s 
results present that Arizona is the only state that failed to represent its voters of 
the six congressional redistricting commissions.  
 
As stated previously, the main argument for why commissions fail commonly 
deals with the political party affiliation of the state that the commission resides in.  
However, in Sam Wang’s article, he even argues that this manipulative trait of 
gerrymandering is more apparent in republican states where the politicians “facing 
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demographic and ideological changes in the electorate, use redistricting to cling to 
power.” (Wang 2013).  It is essential that this variable be analyzed closely. 
 
The National Conference of State Legislatures provides information on the 
different structures of the redistricting commissions.  The information that they 
provide on each commission in the chart is the number of members in the 
commission, the selection requirements for the members of the commission, the 
formation date of the commission, the initial deadline of their redistricting plan 
and the final deadline.  My initial plan for this research project was to look at 
these different factors and assess if any patterns could be identified between the 
different commissions that had gerrymandered in 2012.  However, due to the lack 
of research on what makes a redistricting commission successful, I became 
worried about not finding a result and have decided to add more variables to what 
could explain why certain redistricting commissions have been successful.  
Therefore, I will not only look at the information provided on the structure by the 
NCSL, but also other structural variables such as looking deeper into if the 
commission is from a Republican or Democratic state, if it is bi or non-partisan 
commission, and if it is political or independent.  During this research it is 
furthermore important for me to keep in mind that the answer could lie in other 
explanations outside of the structure.   
 
I have chosen very recent material in order to make this study current, and 
gain a current perspective on how redistricting commissions are today.  For 
instance, since the census is done every ten years, the most recent was done in 
2010 which means that all commissions were chosen between 2010 and 2011 and 
that new districts were drawn 2011.  
 
 
2.3.1 Delimitations 
I have limited myself to looking at the congressional redistricting commissions in 
the United States of America so that I can have a clear focus on them, separated 
from the additional states that have state legislative redistricting commissions as 
well.  I am aware of the fact that the method of this essay may seem very 
simplistic, but this was a way to ensure a clear result of the structure of the 
commission.  Having added too many variables may just have made it so that too 
many factors played a role and made outside variables have an affect that was not 
necessarily true. The method I have chosen will be able to allow me to focus on 
the details that I believe were important and interesting for this study. 
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3 Analysis 
 
By analyzing these six commission’s (Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, New 
Jersey, and Washington) composition, I will be able to identify if there are any 
patterns between what makes a successful commission and distinguish any 
significant feature that makes Arizona, the failed state, different than the others.  
If this analysis does find any noteworthy information, then we can better 
understand how to improve the structures of the redistricting commissions.  First, 
I will write out all of the structures of the six commissions, then continue to 
identify the possible patterns.    
 
The information on the structure provided by the NCSL will be labeled A in 
the analysis portion, while the information regarding state party affiliation will be 
labeled B and whether the commission is bi/non partisan and independent or 
political will be labeled C. 
3.1 Criterions for the Analysis 
 
As the theory portion suggested, the structure of an organization allows us to 
understand its functions and powers.  Therefore it is important to know how many 
members are selected for each redistricting commission and how they are chosen.  
The first variable, which analyzes the commission’s size attempts to examine if it 
is possible that if it is a large or smaller commission plays a role, as well as 
identifying if there is a pattern in the decision process of who elects these different 
members. It is always important to keep in mind who it is that elects the 
“experts”, or in this case, redistricting members. 
 
The time frame of the redistricting commissions is important because “the 
power of the commission is evoked if they are unable to complete their task in 
time.” (Cain 2012, P. 23).  If the commissions is unable to perform their duty, 
then not only have they been declared unsuccessful, but the important task of 
redistricting will be given to others who may have a stronger interest in 
manipulating the redistricting system. So, examining if the amount of time that the 
commission has is long or short might show if there is a tendency of being able to 
complete the appropriate task. 
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The second factor that is examined in this research essay is if the state that the 
redistricting commissions is in has a majority party that is democrat or republican.  
Amongst the previous research on this topic, the most common topic that was 
suggested was that the party affiliation of the states has an influence on if the 
redistricting commissions are successful or not. As noted earlier, Sam Wang 
suggests that republicans are more prone to gerrymander. His suggestion to fix 
this is that the United States of America must use non-partisan commissions, 
which will be interesting to examine in the analysis (Wang 2013).  
 
Staying on Sam Wang’s hypothesis, another important variable that this study 
will examine is in fact if the commission is bi or non-partisan.  Some research 
argues that if a commission is bi partisan, the parties will not be able to work 
together harmoniously (Cain 2012, P. 23).  An issue that could possibly arise is 
that bi partisan commissions become forced to “compromise on goals in order to 
get enough votes to please a supermajority” and end up giving in to a redistricting 
plan that is not as representative as it should be (Cain 2012, P. 30). Karch even 
argues that the internal and external pressures that can be placed on a commission 
are dangerous and states that the partisan commissions could face a “ path 
dominated by legislative insiders and interparty wrangling.” (Karch et. Al. 2007, 
P. 808).   However, the non-partisan commissions also face critique.  For 
example, some research mentions that non-partisan redistricting commissions may 
also be influenced by external interest groups, which could lead to other negative 
affects (Karch et.al. 2007, P. 808). I believe that this variable will be extremely 
interesting to analyze in this essay.  
 
It is also important to analyze the commissions that have a member who has a 
non-declared party preference.  Some of these commissions are divided up so that 
half of the commission represents the Republican Party; half represents the 
Democratic Party and have an additional member or members who are designated 
to have a neutral opinion.  This extra person can sometimes be a hassle though. It 
is argued that one problem with commissions that have an extra member that is 
chosen as the independent or decline to state member, may possibly be criticized 
or regarded as being a “closet partisan” and the “legitimacy of the whole exercise 
falls apart.” (Cain 2012, P. 22).  The critique of this extra person can add 
unnecessary quarrel and waste time that could be spent on better redistricting or 
on the contrary, add the necessary unbiased opinion that makes the redistricting 
process fairer.  This is why this variable is also so interesting to examine. 
 
Furthermore, it is imperative to make clear the difference between politician 
based and independent commissions.  A politician commission is “composed of 
elected officials or their designees.  While they are not independent in the sense of 
being separated from the power and influence of elected officials, they are 
autonomous in the sense that they do not have to submit their plans to the 
legislature like advisory commissions or wait until there is a legislative 
breakdown like backup commissions.”  (Cain 2012, P. 7).  Independent 
commissions on the other hand are actually separated from elected officials and 
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have the “ability to put district lines in place without legislative approval.  The 
independent citizen commission design is the culmination of a reform effort 
aimed at lessening legislators’ ability to choose the district lines they run in.” 
(Cain 2012, P. 8).  These two different types of factors may be factors that show a 
pattern of what kind of structure in a commission functions best. It is argued that 
the best part about independent commissions is “not their degree of separation 
from incumbents or politics generally, but their capacity to negotiate to meet 
supermajority vote thresholds and agree on reasonably imperfect plans (i.e. good 
redistricting plans).” (Cain 2012, P. 30).  The important question in this matter is 
to identify if  “independent or politician commission systems arrive at outcomes 
that will be regarded as sufficiently fair by the political parties to dampen disputes 
and keep the courts from having to take over the line-drawing process?” (Cain 
2012, P. 25). 
 
Many researches argue that the more separated from politicians and party 
affiliations a commission is, the better it will function. Therefore it is argued that 
“State-level redistricting reform, particularly in the form of independent 
commissions, is absolutely necessary in order to fulfill the promise of government 
for the people, by the people.” (Hebert & Jenkins 2011, P. 558). 
 
A reliable source called All About Redistricting has been used to provide “the 
latest” on each of the commissions redistricting duties and I will include some of 
the information provided as a summary of each commissions redistricting process 
in order to give an overview of how the redistricting took place in each of the 
states.  This source is from a Professor at Loyola Marymount University who has 
his focus on redistricting. 
 
The US Supreme Court created criteria for the redistricting process in the 
different states and it is incredible that some states still fail to meet the criteria for 
creating fair representation.  Hopefully the following analysis, formed by the 
structural approach, will shed some understanding on why certain commissions 
are built to succeed and how some still manage to fail.  
 
3.2 Redistricting Commission’s Analysis 
 
3.2.1 Arizona 
Not only is Arizona especially important to analyze since it is accused of having 
failed in the last great gerrymander, but there is also a lot of interesting 
information regarding Arizona’s redistricting commission amongst literature.   For 
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example, one article states how “Arizona and California independent redistricting 
commissions are the boldest departures from the traditional legislative 
redistricting model […] they are also natural experiments we can learn the most 
from because they embody elements of almost every redistricting reform idea ever 
proposed” (Cain 2012, P. 3).  What I find most interesting about this statement is 
how California was able to succeed why Arizona did not. Perhaps certain 
similarities will be prominent between these two redistricting commissions. 
 
Another interesting fact about Arizona’s redistricting commission is that it 
seems to have struggled in the past.  Cain writes “Arizona’s commission was sued 
in 2001 and had already been challenged in court before it drew any lines in 
2011” (Cain 2012, P. 29).  However, this source was unable to describe Arizona’s 
failure.  Hopefully, this research essay will be able to do so because the tradition 
of gerrymandering in Arizona needs a new solution. 
 
All about redistricting gives some more information on the latest redistricting 
cycle and mentions that Arizona’s final congressional maps were “precleared on 
April 9; state legislative maps were submitted on Feb. 28, and precleared on April 
26.  Litigation has been filed against both sets of plans.  A controversy, allegedly 
over violations of the state’s Open Meetings Law, led to the Nov. 1 impeachment 
of the commission’s chair.  After the state Attorney General launched an 
investigation based on these allegations, seeking a court order forcing the 
independent commissioners to cooperate, the commissioners counter-sued, 
alleging political interference with their process.  Before the investigation was 
complete, the Governor called for the impeachment of the commission’s chair, 
which was approved by 2/3 of the state Senate; on November 17, the Arizona 
Supreme Court found the impeachment improper and reinstated the chair.” (AAR-
Arizona).  The first thought I had was that this open meeting mess could have 
been problematic and been a reason that Arizona’s redistricting commission was 
unsuccessful, but after some more thought, I ruled this factor out of the 
explanation equation. However, as we can see, the redistricting process in Arizona 
was not only just sloppy from the most recent redistricting process, but seems to 
have a tradition of being messy. 
 
Earlier in this essay I mentioned how voters need to start becoming more 
active in the redistricting process to ensure that they are not being manipulated.  
Another interesting fact about Arizona is the visible change regarding citizen 
participation in Arizona, where voters were so outraged with the legislative 
redistricting in 2000, that they “expressed their disapproval of the political 
manipulation [and] installing independent commissions to take responsibility for 
drawing congressional and state legislative maps.” (Hebert & Jenkins 2011, P.  
556).  This is a positive sign that the voters are more aware of the political 
manipulation around them.  Perhaps even more citizen awareness and 
participation in Arizona will improve the next redistricting process.  
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A.  The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission’s board consists of 
five members.  However, the appointment process is very different with the 
commission appellate court appointees holding the responsibility for creating a 
“pool of 25 nominees, ten from each of the two largest parties and five not from 
either of the two largest parties. The highest ranking officer of the house appoints 
one from the pool, then the minority leader of the house appoints one, then the 
highest ranking officer of the senate appoints one, then the minority leader of the 
senate appoints one.  These four appoint a fifth from the pool, not a member of 
any party already represented on the commission, as chair.  If the four deadlock, 
the commission on appellate court appointments appoints the chair” (NCSL 
2013).  The commission formed February 28, 2011, but had no initial or final 
deadline. 
B.  Arizona is a republican state as of the election in 2012.  However, it is 
interesting to see that it was a fairly close election result (Politico 2012). 
C.  This is an “independent commission with balanced partisan composition” 
(AAR 2013). 
 
3.2.2 California 
Although California is referred to as a “legacy of failed reform”, it appears that it 
has changed its image and become successful with the most recent redistricting 
process (Cain 2012, P. 11). California is known for testing new techniques of 
reform and for “taking reform to the next level” so it is interesting to see if these 
new reform techniques are prevalent in the structure (Cain 2012, P. 11).  
 
Even Sam Wang’s article on gerrymandering states that “surprisingly absent 
from the guilty list is California, where 62 percent of the two-party vote went to 
democrats and the average mock delegation of 38 democrats and 15 republicans 
exactly matched the newly elected delegation.” (Wang 2013).  It is wonderful to 
see that the unfair redistricting in California has improved with the 
implementation of the commission. 
 
The California congressional redistricting maps were established confirmed 
“district lines until the next cycle” on August 15, 2011. The only issue that was 
found with them was the need “to account for the distortion caused by people in 
prison” which was mandatory to change at the next redistricting process in 2020 
(AAR 2013). 
 
A.  California Citizens Redistricting Commission was formed in 2008 with the 
passage of Proposition 11.  NCSL states, “the process of redrawing California’s 
state legislative districts was removed from state legislative authority and given to 
a newly established 14 member commission.  The commission must include 5 
Democrats, 5 Republicans, and 4 members from neither party.  Government 
auditors are to select 60 registered voters from an applicant pool. Legislative 
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leaders can reduce the pool; the auditors then are to pick eight commission 
members by lottery, and those commissioners pick six additional members for 14 
total.  For approval district boundaries need votes from three Democratic 
Commissioners, three republican commissioners and three commissioners from 
neither party” (NCSL 2013).  The formation date of this commission is December 
31, 2010 and each year ending in the number zero thereafter.  The initial deadline 
is unavailable, however the final deadline is by September 15, 2011 and in each 
year ending in the number 1 thereafter (NCSL 2013). 
B.  California is a democratic state (Politico 2012). 
C. As stated previously, the Californian redistricting commission, like 
Arizona, is said to be very different than others.  One very interesting fact about 
California’s redistricting commission is that it is citizen based. The commission is 
bi partisan with a requirement that 5 members be democrat, 5 members 
republican, and 4 members that do not represent either party (NCSL 2013).  This 
is furthermore an independent redistricting commission  (AAR 2013). 
 
 
3.2.3 Hawaii 
“After a series of meetings, the commission released draft plans on August 3, 
2011, and final plans on September 26.  On January 4, 2012, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court rejected the state legislative plans, for failure to properly exclude 
nonresident population under the state constitution.” (AAR 2013). As we can see, 
although the state legislative plan was rejected, the congressional plan was 
actually passed. 
 
A.  Different individuals appoint Hawaii’s nine-member commission.  First, 
the “president of the senate selects two.  Speaker of the House selects two.  
Minority senate party selects two.  These eight selected the ninth member, who is 
the chair.  No commission member may run for the legislature in the two elections 
following redistricting.” (NCSL 2013).  The formation date for Hawaii’s 
commission is by March 1
st
, 2011.  The initial deadline was 80 days after the 
commission forms and the final deadline was 150 days after commission 
formation  (NCSL 2013). 
B.  Hawaii is a democratic state (Politico 2012). 
C.  The Hawaiian politician commission is bi partisan (AAR 2013). 
 
3.2.4 Idaho 
Similar to Arizona and California, Idaho’s redistricting commission is also new.  
Interestingly enough, the commission is not as present in the literature on 
redistricting commissions as Arizona and California are.  This is perhaps due to 
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the fact that it does not have such a troublesome redistricting history.  All about 
redistricting writes that “the state’s first independent commission, convened in the 
spring of 2011, conducted public hearings through early September.  The 
commission reached agreement on September 23, but not by its September 6 
deadline; the late agreement became guidance for a new commission, created by 
order of the Secretary of State on September 13.” (AAR 2013).  The fact that a 
new commission was created is extremely interesting because it deals with the 
failure of the commission being able to get its job done in time and maybe 
therefore is less successful.  The first thought that comes to mind is that it is 
because this commission is fairly new.  However, this commission was able to 
complete its task and “on October 17, the new commission issued a congressional 
plan.”  (AAR 2013) 
 
A.  Idaho’s redistricting commission is a 6-member commission chosen by 
“leaders of two largest political parties in each house of the legislature each 
designate one member; chairs of the two parties whose candidates for governor 
received the most votes in the last election each designate one member.  No 
member may be an elected or appointed official in the state at the time of 
designation.” (NCSL 2013). The formation date of the commission is within 15 
days of the secretary of state’s orders to create a commission.  The initial deadline 
is unavailable and the final deadline is 90 days after the commission is organized 
or that the census information has been received (NCSL 2013). 
B.    Idaho is a republican state (Politico 2012). 
C.  Idaho’s redistricting commission is an “independent commission with 
balanced partisan composition” (AAR 2013). 
 
 
3.2.5 New Jersey 
 
There was not a lot of information provided on New Jersey, which may be an 
indicator on a smooth redistricting process.  The only information provided by All 
About Redistricting is that “on December 23, the commission drawing 
congressional districts approved a final plan.” (AAR 2013). 
 
A.  Unlike the other commissions in this research project, New Jersey uses 
different commissions for its congressional redistricting and state legislative 
redistricting.  The congressional redistricting consists of a 13-member board. The 
“four legislative leaders (majority and minority leader in each legislative 
chamber) and the chairs of the state’s two major political parties each choose two 
commissioners, none of whom may be a congressional member or employee. 
Those twelve commissioners then choose a thirteenth who has not held any public 
or party office in New Jersey within the last five years.  If the twelve 
commissioners are not able to select a thirteenth member to serve as chair, they 
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will present two names to the state Supreme Court, which will choose their chair.  
The members of the commission are to be appointed with ‘due consideration to 
geographic, ethnic, and racial diversity.’ (N.J. Const. art. II, II) . . . If the 
commission is not able to draw lines by its deadline, it must submit two plans to 
the state Supreme Court, which will select a winning plan.” (AAR 2013).   The 
timing for the selection of the commission members in New Jersey is “no later 
than November 15, and the commission must attempt to draw lines no later than 
one month after receipt of Census data” (AAR 2013). However, there was no final 
deadline provided for this commission. 
B.  New Jersey is a democratic state (Politico 2012). 
C.  New Jersey’s redistricting commission is a “political commission with 
balanced partisan composition” (AAR 2013). 
 
3.2.6 Washington 
All About Redistricting writes “On January 1, 2012, the independent commission 
responsible for redistricting released final maps along with a final report for 
congressional and state legislative districts. On February 1, the state legislature 
passed EHCR 4409, a slightly amended version of those plans, by greater than the 
requisite 2/3 vote.” (AAR 2013). 
 
A.  Washington’s commission is similar to Pennsylvania’s in the sense that 
minority and majority leaders of the house and senate each select a member and 
these four members select the fifth member.  However, an important fact is that 
this fifth member must be a non-voter.  If the commission is unable to choose the 
fifth member by January 1, 2011, than the Supreme Court is responsible for doing 
so by February 5, 2011 (NCSL 2013).  The formation date of this commission is 
by January 31, 2011.  The initial deadline is unavailable and the final deadline is 
January 1, 2012 (NCSL 2013). 
B.  Washington is a democratic state (Politico 2012). 
C. Washington’s redistricting commission is an independent, bipartisan 
commission (AAR 2013). 
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4 Conclusion 
4.1 Result 
A. Unfortunately no trends were prominent in the variables that regarded the 
number of commission members, the way they were selected, or the time frame 
that they were working with. The build up and time line of all the different 
commissions were very different.  The only real similarity that was prevalent was 
the fact that most of these commissions divided it up so that half of the members 
of the commission were from one majority party, while half the members were 
from another one of the majority party, with one, or sometimes even a few, extra 
non-declared members.  The other similarity that I could find was that Arizona 
and Washington both had five member commissions, while the other commissions 
had at least one more, often at least double that amount.  The creation date of the 
commission, initial deadline of the commission and final deadline of the 
commissions showed no significance either and were very sporadic.  It was 
shocking to see how spread out the time frames for the commissions were.  For 
example while California already had its plans approved in August 2011, 
Arizona’s were completed in April the following year. It is strange that these 
commissions were all designed in different ways and did not copy each other in 
any apparent way when discovering the best way to be structured.  
It became apparent to me that the date that Hawaii’s maps were designed was 
actually after the deadline that they were given.  For some reason, the maps were 
cleared anyways and I can not find any more information on why that is.   
 
B.  In regards of the party affiliation of the state that the redistricting 
commission is in, two of the six states were Republican while the rest were 
democratic.  The two states that were republican were Arizona and Idaho.  As I 
mentioned earlier, the “Great Gerrymander of 2012” suggests that the majority 
political party of each state is a determining factor for the gerrymandering in the 
states.  However, since Idaho also has republican majority and was not accused of 
the gerrymandering, I do not believe our analysis can draw any conclusions that 
argue that this is the sole reason for the failure of the redistricting commission in 
Arizona.  A different method of evaluating all the gerrymandered states in regards 
to their political party affiliation could be a future study to actually see the impact 
that political party affiliation has.  
 
C. As stated previously, Sam Wang argues that the solution to gerrymandering 
is to have non-partisan commissions and in this study, all six of the congressional 
redistricting commissions are bi partisan commissions.  This has shown that there 
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is no evidence implying that the bi or nonpartisan factor has an effect on the 
commission.  Four of the six redistricting commissions were independent while 
two of the commissions were politician based.  The two that were politician based 
were Hawaii and New Jersey, which shows that the commission being 
independent or politician based does not seem to have an affect on the success rate 
of the commission.  
 
4.2 Discussion 
 
The purpose of this study was to identify if the structure of the redistricting 
commissions played a role in if they were successful or not.  According to the 
variables that I have used (structure in regards to number of members, how they 
are chosen, the creation date of the commission, the initial date that the 
redistricting plan is due, the final date that the redistricting plan is due, whether 
the party’s majority party is democrat or republican, if the district is non partisan 
or bi partisan and if the commission is an independent or politician commission), 
there are no significant factors that stand out in regards to the actual structure of 
the commission that have a crucial impact on the success of the commission.   
 
Although this result was at first disappointing and unanticipated, I realized 
that this result still provides important information to the field of scientific 
knowledge.  By knowing that the structure is not necessarily the determining 
factor for whether a commission is successful or not, future research can continue 
on to look at other factors that could be solutions.  Not finding a solution is in a 
way a contribution to the efforts of searching for the solution and an interesting 
result in itself. 
 
In the theory portion of this essay, I mentioned how essential the build up of 
an organization is and this still holds true regardless of if the structure is or isn’t 
what determines a commission successful or not.  Hague and Harropp’s theory on 
the structure led to a very interesting idea that they would have an affect and even 
if it did not contribute to proving what factors are relevant when it comes to the 
success rate of commissions, it still has made it so that we can know more and 
better understand the structure of these congressional redistricting commissions.  
There theory has in no way been proved false or unhelpful by this study. 
 
One of the factors that surprised me the most was that I thought that there 
would be more identifiable similarities or traits between California and Arizona’s 
redistricting commissions since many sources have said that they both are very 
unlike the other commissions and are the newest states (along with Idaho) to form 
a congressional redistricting commission.  As mentioned previously, both of these 
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redistricting commissions have also been claimed to have trouble with 
redistricting plans in the past.  
 
California recently implemented their citizen based redistricting commission 
and as stated previously, has previously been accused of struggling with 
gerrymandering.  This made me wonder if the implementation of a transparent 
citizen commission is the solution to end gerrymandering.  However, this essay 
has not necessarily showed solid proof that this is the case since California’s was 
the only one of the commissions with this variable.  One article by Boatright, 
Giner, and Gomer made me more interested in studying if this really is the case 
and should be researched in greater detail. The article states that the new 
implementation of redistricting software is proving to be a very effective way to 
draw district lines.  Their article is based on students in Massachusetts’s who got 
the opportunity to test the software and create fairer districts.  Allowing citizens to 
draw the district lines may not only make the redistricting process more 
transparent, but also make it so that the commissions were nonpartisan and 
nonbiased (Boatright et.al 2013, P. 387). Perhaps the redistricting process will 
evolve to a more technological one with a more efficient way of redistricting after 
the next census as technology advancements are made.   
 
The other factor that I found most surprising was the fact that the party 
affiliation did not show clearer signs of affecting the redistricting commissions.  
As stated earlier, the most common accusation for failed redistricting 
commissions is that the majority political party played an essential role in the 
gerrymandering.   One source even states “there is no question that partisan 
gerrymandering can produce a short-term electoral advantage for the party that 
draws the lines.” (McKenzie 2012, P. 800). I believe that this variable is crucial to 
examine in greater detail, even on the state legislative redistricting commissions to 
see what affects they have and that this factor should be monitored closely in 
following redistricting implementations in order to ensure that the majority party 
that is drawing the lines can be trusted. Sam Wang is not the only one that has 
argued this point. Stephanopoulos writes, “in short, redistricting initiatives 
generally fail because they provoke fierce opposition from the majority party in 
the state legislature, which feels threatened by the possibility of fairer district 
lines.” (Stephanopoulos 2007, P. 382). This threat could possibly lead to 
redistricting commissions to draw their lines in a way to benefit a certain party.  
My hypothesis is that it is inevitable that we will see partisan unfairness in the 
redistricting process since the “redistricting affects legislators’ careers and the 
balance of power between the political parties.  New district boundaries can 
increase the electoral security of some members of congress and cause others to 
face uncertain electoral prospects.” (Karch 2007, P. 808).  These politicians 
serving different political parties obviously want the best for their party, and it is 
crucial to observe and ensure that they do not attempt to do so at unfair lengths. 
Therefore, I highlight the importance of keeping track of the political party 
affiliation when the redistricting lines are redrawn in 2020 and maybe even 
performing more research on previous data from election returns. 
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Keeping an eye on the role of the political parties in future redistricting 
initiatives is not the only future study on this topic that I am interested in.  I 
concur that more research should be done on this topic since redistricting 
commissions “are in theory better suited to district-drawing than state legislatures, 
and empirically have produced more competitive elections and more 
representative results”. (Stephanopoulos 2007, p. 388).  For this reason it is vital 
to continue studying why certain commissions are failing to get their jobs done?  
The curiosity of finding the answer to this was so intriguing that I have discovered 
other variables to look at in future studies. Ideas for the explanation of why 
certain commissions succeed have been provided, but not proven or confirmed. 
 
For example, other factors that could be crucial may be how many seats are 
given or taken away in each state that the redistricting commission is in, the 
transparency of the commission, or the acceptance and implementation of new 
redistricting plans from citizens.  Having a more open redistricting plan “lessens 
the dangers of collusive cooperation between the parties and potential staff bias" 
as well as decreasing "the focus on any given individual and the general suspicion 
about closet partisans to some degree.” (Cain 2012, P. 26). It could also be 
interesting to examine if there are any external incentives or interest groups that 
support the redistricting commissions and with that have a considerable impact on 
the performance of the commissions.  This view is argued by Karch, who believes 
that the individuals within the redistricting commissions may have their own 
agendas (Karch et.al. 2007, P.808). 
 
Stephanopous furthermore argues that other variables that could have an affect 
on the redistricting commissions ability to perform are campaign spending and 
possibly that the “positions taken by the elites affect the likelihood of if an 
initiative will pass.” He continues on this topic of the power of the elites by 
suggesting that the ”positions adopted by major parties, may be able to convince 
party members that it isn’t a good plan” (Stephanopoulos 2007, P. 343- 344). This 
view is a bit similar to the previously mentioned one that regards solely party 
affiliation but goes deeper into the individuals that can have an affect on the 
propositions. 
 
Another study that I found would be very interesting to look at in the future 
(that does not regard variables for what makes a successful commission) is why 
these six states only use commissions for their congressional redistricting and not 
for their state legislative?  If they have faith in their commission, shouldn’t they 
be able to use it for state and federal redistricting? Seven states besides the six in 
this study use redistricting commissions for their state legislative redistricting and 
it would be interesting to see what their take on congressional redistricting is. It is 
coincidentally interesting that many of the states that Sam Wang points out that 
have issues with gerrymandering are states that use a state legislative redistricting 
commission. 
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Overall, the answer to this research question is that the structure of the 
redistricting commissions is not inevitably a factor that determines if the 
commission is successful or not.  However, I also believe that it would be 
interesting to keep an eye on the variables that I analyzed in this essay even in the 
next redistricting period to see if there are any more patterns that become 
apparent, especially the party affiliation variable, and citizen transparency 
variable.  I could also attempt to look at the redistricting propositions from the 
past but that may be a bit troubling since a lot of the commissions were 
implemented recently so most of the information for the study would be 
unavailable.   
 
It is argued that “state reforms are essential in the drive to push away from the 
perils of politically-driven redistricting.”(Hebert & Jenkins 2011, P. 558)  The 
only problem we are faced with is how to ensure that the redistricting 
commissions are helping create representative redistricting.  Although my 
hypothesis that the structures played a significant role in the congressional 
redistricting commissions success failed, it is imperative to keep searching for the 
answer on what makes a more successful organization.  Hopefully, this essay 
contributes to this search for a more equal and representative redistricting process 
that stops the manipulation of lines. 
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